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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a summary dismissal of Rhinehart's Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78A-4-103(2)(f) (2010) and § 78B-9-110 (2010). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Point I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY NOT GIVING THE PARTIES PRIOR 
NOTICE OF CONVERTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
INTO ONE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When reviewing the failure to convert a motion to dismiss 
under rule 12(b)(6) to a motion for summary judgment, "it is reversible error unless the 
dismissal can be justified without considering the outside documents." Oakwood Vill., 
L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, ^ 12, 104 P.3d 1226. A dismissal under Rule 
12(b)(6) is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 
H 6, 155P.3d893. 
The improper conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment 
is plain error, requiring no preservation in the court below. Establishment of a plain error 
requires a showing of: (1) an error; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Holgate, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). 
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Point II 
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDERING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION AS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISMISSING THE 
PETITION ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When reviewing a trial court's dismissal of an action on 
summary judgment, the dismissal is reviewed for correctness, granting no deference to the 
district court's conclusions. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ^  15, 250 P.3d 56. Petitioner preserved 
this matter for appeal by filing her Response to State's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 190-210.) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6): 
How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the 
responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may at 
the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
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defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or 
objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of 
such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert at the 
trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or 
to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the 
commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the 
adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is 
asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary 
judgment as to all or any part thereof 
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(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in 
accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there 
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not 
rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court 
at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and 
by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith 
controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without 
substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and 
the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing 
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be 
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admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to 
testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may 
permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file 
such a response. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party 
opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for 
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order 
the party presenting them to pay to the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses 
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which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any 
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter arose out of Petitioner's Petition for Habeas Corpus and Post 
Conviction Relief, filed on August 14, 2008. (R. 3-29.) Respondent did not file an 
answer to the Petition, but filed instead a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Post Conviction Relief, on March 3, 2009. (R 67.) Respondent argued that 
Petitioner did not meet her burden through her Petition and requested that the matter be 
dismissed. (See, e.g., R. at 75; 81; 90; 99.) Respondent attached documents to its 
Motion to Dismiss, including transcripts of the plea proceeding and the Statement in 
Advance of Plea. (R 101-163.) 
At the hearing, the court was uncertain of the standard to be applied to 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (R. 271: pp. 6-7.) Although Respondent stated that 
the hearing should be treated as one for summary judgment, Respondent did not refer to 
the summary judgment standard, but talked about the sufficiency of the pleadings. (R. 
271: pg. 7.) The court determined, ultimately, that Petitioner had not met her burden to 
establish the elements of her claim through a preponderance of the evidence and 
dismissed Petitioner's Petition. (R. 236.) Petitioner filed this appeal. (R. 261-262.) 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 18, 2005, Petitioner, Tamra Rhinehart, pled guilty to one count of 
aggravated murder in Case Number 031100633. Petitioner directly appealed her 
conviction to the Utah Supreme Court on several grounds, including that she was 
deprived of her right to effective assistance of counsel when she entered her guilty plea. 
The Utah Supreme Court determined that it was without jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's 
challenge to the lawfulness of her guilty plea, because she never filed a motion to 
withdraw that plea. 
On or about August 14, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and Post-Conviction Relief (the "Petition"). (R. 3-29.) In the Petition, Petitioner asserted 
that she had received ineffective assistance of counsel during her criminal proceedings, 
particularly relative to her guilty plea. (Id.) Petitioner also alleged that she received 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, who failed to raise the issue of a misplea on 
direct appeal. (Id.) 
Respondent, the State of Utah, requested three extensions of time in which to 
respond to the Petition. (R. 50-52; 55-57; 60-62) On March 3, 2009, Respondent filed its 
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief (the 
"Motion to Dismiss"). (R 67.) Respondent argued in its Motion to Dismiss that 
Petitioner had not "carried her burden" of establishing that her trial counsel was 
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ineffective. (See, e.g., R. at 75; 81; 90; 99.) Respondent also requested that the trial ' 
court hold an evidentiary hearing to address any issues not resolved through its Motion to m 
Dismiss. (R. 99.) In support of its Motion to Dismiss, Respondent attached a copy of the 
opinion in State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, a copy of Petitioner's Statement in Advance • 
of Plea, and a transcript of the plea hearing, held on March 18, 2005. (R 101-163.) 4 
Petitioner also requested several extensions of time in which to respond to the 
Motion to Dismiss. (R 164; 175-176.) Respondent filed a Notice to Submit on its • 
Motion to Dismiss on June 29, 2010. (R. 167-168.) Petitioner filed a Request for an m 
Evidentiary Hearing on the Petition on June 30, 2010. (R. 169-170.) The trial court 
granted Petitioner more time to file her response to the Motion to Dismiss, which • 
response was filed on or about October 19, 2010. (R. 177-179.) In her response, m 
Petitioner argued that she had met the procedural requirements to file the Petition. (R. 
190-196.) Petitioner argued further that her trial counsel was ineffective, in that she was w 
coercive during pre-plea discussions and at the taking of the plea; that Petitioner did not m 
"knowingly and voluntarily" waive her right to a jury during the sentencing phase of her 
case; that Petitioner was under the influence of Lexapro at the time of entry of her plea; % 
that counsel misstated information during pre-plea discussions; and that counsel failed to ** 
file a motion to withdraw the guilty plea prior to sentencing. (R. 190-197.) Petitioner 
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attached several exhibits to her response to the Motion to Dismiss, including a 
photograph taken at the time of the sentencing hearing. (R. at 199.) 
The trial court held a non-evidentiary hearing on January 31, 2010. (R. 232.) 
Counsel for both parties was present. (Id.) Initially, Respondent indicated that it 
anticipated that the court would treat its Motion to Dismiss as a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings. (R. 271: pg. 5.) The court then held a conference with counsel in 
chambers, where the parties discussed how Petitioner's appointed counsel would be 
compensated and the "exact purpose of this hearing[.]" (R. 271: pp. 5-6.) At first, the 
court indicated that the purpose of the hearing was a " 12(b)(6) review hearing to see if 
the pleadings are sufficient taking everything that the petitioner is saying as true, 
sufficient for an evidentiary hearing on this matter to take it essentially to the next level." 
(R. 271: pg. 6.) Respondent clarified that "we've moved beyond the 12(b)(6) stage to 
summary judgment stage by virtue of the attachments to the pleadings." (Id.) The trial 
court indicated that "[t]he standard's the same" whether the parties proceed under 
12(b)(6) or summary judgment. (R. 271: pg. 7.) The court did not offer either party an 
opportunity to provide any additional evidence. (Id.) 
The court took argument from the parties and then indicated that a decision would 
be forthcoming. (R. 271: pp. 36-37.) The court issued its Memorandum Decision on or 
about May 28, 2011. (R. 233-237.) It its decision, the trial court indicated that it "ha[d] 
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reviewed the Motion and Memorandum, the Opposition, the Reply, each document 
submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions" along 
with the oral arguments of counsel. (R. 233.) The court found "that the allegations in the 
Petition are insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Petitioner's 
trial counsel's representation fell below and objective standard of reasonableness." (R. 
234.) 
With regards to Petitioner's claim that her appellate counsel was also ineffective 
for failure to raise a misplea, the court found "Petitioner has failed to show that there was 
ca reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits 
brief, [s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal.'" (R. 236.) The court concluded by 
determining that Petitioner "failed to carry her burden of proof on both of her grounds for 
relief raised in her Petition." (Id.) The court dismissed the Petition. (Id.) An order 
dismissing the Petition was signed by the court on July 2, 2010. (R. 238-239.) Petitioner 
filed her Notice ofAppeal on July 16, 2010. (R. 261-262.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The court erred in addressing Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the Petition. The 
court did not state whether it would include or exclude matters outside of the pleadings. 
The court did not give the parties notice until the hearing that it would treat the Motion to 
Dismiss as one for summary judgment. Even after stating that the standard was summary 
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judgment, the court failed to apply that standard to the information before it. A review of 
the Petition under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard would have resulted in a ruling that the 
pleadings were sufficient to state a claim for relief. 
Even if the trial court did not err in converting the Motion to Dismiss to a 
summary judgment motion without providing any reasonable notice, the court failed to 
apply the correct summary judgment standard. Respondent had to show that there were 
no genuine issues of material facts, and that Respondent was entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Petitioner had place several material facts in dispute through affidavits 
attached to her pleadings. The court inappropriately weighed evidence and made 
evidentiary determinations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE PETITIONER PROPER NOTICE OF 
ITS CONVERSION OF THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER UTAH 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6) INTO ONE FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides in pertinent part: 
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
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all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
If the court considers any materials outside of the pleadings, the court must convert the 
motion into a motion for summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12; case cite about 
mandatory language in a rule or statute. A matter outside of the pleadings is "any written 
or oral evidence .. .which ... substantiates] ... and does not merely reiterate what is said 
in the pleadings." Oakwood Village, at ]f 12. The court is required to give both parties 
reasonable notice of the conversion and a meaningful opportunity to submit pertinent 
summary judgment materials to the court. Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 UT App 10,1{ 17, 155 
P.3d 893. This is particularly important to the party against whom judgment is entered. 
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977). 
In this matter, the trial court gave no notice prior to the hearing as to how it would 
address the matter. The court failed to make any indication as to what it would or would 
not consider in the process of deciding the Motion to Dismiss. The court did not engage 
in any discussion with the parties as to whether Petitioner would submit additional 
information in support of a summary judgment motion. Petitioner had no "reasonable 
notice" of the conversion and had no opportunity to submit additional information to the 
court. 
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The record is unclear as to which standard was actually applied in this matter to 
reach the order of dismissal. During the January 31, 2010, hearing, the court indicated 
that whether the review was under rule 12(b)(6) or summary judgment, "the standard's 
the same." Such an ambiguous statement cannot be considered adequate notice of the 
conversion. The court itself did not articulate under which rule the hearing was to 
proceed; indeed, even though the State indicated it should be a summary judgment 
motion, counsel for the state cited almost exclusively to the standard under 12(b)(6). 
Even the Memorandum Decision issued on or about May 27, 2010, makes no reference to 
any particular standard that was applied by the court in resolving the motion, making 
review of the order nearly impossible. 
"Because the trial court failed to properly convert [Respondent's] rule 12(b)(6) 
motion into one for summary judgment" that dismissal is subject to reversal unless the 
Court determines, without referring to the matters outside of the pleadings, that Petitioner 
failed to state a claim for relief. Tuttle, 2007 UT App at [^6. 
This dismissal can only be affirmed under 12(b)(6) if "it appears to a certainty that 
the [Petitioner] would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be 
proved in support of [her] claims." Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 109 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). The purpose of a 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the 
pleadings, not the underlying merits of the matters pled. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 
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987, 989 (Utah 1997). The issue before the lower court was "whether the [Petitioner has 
alleged enough in the complaint to state a cause of action, and this preliminary question is 
asked and answered before the court conducts any hearings on the case." Id 
In order for Petitioner to state a claim that she received ineffective assistance of 
j counsel, she must plead, first, "that counsel's performance was deficient" and second, 
! "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 
• U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In order to meet the rule 12(b)(6) standard, Petitioner does not 
i have to "prove" anything; she simply has to have pled facts sufficient to state a claim for 
relief. Petitioner pled multiple facts supporting that her counsel's performance was 
deficient: that "she was coerced by her former trial counsel, Mary Corporon, to plead 
guilty" (R. 6); that trial counsel "promised that if [Petitioner] pled guilty, the trial court 
would 'definitely' sentence her with the possibility of parole" (Id.); that "after the plea 
hearing, [Petitioner] repeatedly asked Ms. Corporon to file a motion to withdraw her plea, 
but Ms. Corporon refused to do so" (R. 7). Petitioner further pointed out that, due to the 
fact that her case was for a capital offense, the ABA Guidelines for Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases apply to the examination of 
counsel's deficiencies. (R. 8.) In short, Petitioner pled sufficient facts to support the first 
prong of the Strickland test, namely that counsel's performance was deficient. 
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Similarly, Petitioner also adequately alleged in her Petition that appellate counsel 
performed deficiently. Petitioner alleged that appellate counsel failed to raise an 
argument on appeal, the misplea, in spite of evidence that supported such an argument. 
Petitioner is not tested on the merits under rule 12(b)(6). She only needs to plead facts 
sufficient to support a claim for relief. 
With regards to the second prong of the Strickland test, Petitioner had to plead that 
she was prejudiced by the deficiencies of counsel. Under her claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner alleges that but for the coercion of her trial counsel, 
she would have proceeded to trial. Petitioner alleges further that had trial counsel filed 
the motion to withdraw her plea, Petitioner would have been able to address deficiencies 
in her plea before the appellate court. Petitioner clearly pled facts to satisfy the second 
Strickland prong. See Alvarez, 933 P.2d at 990 (suggesting that allegations showing had 
counsel offered proper advice that the petitioner would have acted differently suffice to 
plead prejudice). 
Again, Petitioner satisfied the same requirement under her claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner alleges that the claim of misplea could be 
raised at any time, and that her counsel failed to do so. Petitioner further alleges that the 
results would have been different, based upon the other allegations made regarding the 
deficiencies of the plea. 
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Petitioner's pleadings are sufficient to withstand rule 12(b)(6) review. She 
adequately pled both prongs of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
She is entitled to an evidentiary hearing in order to prove her allegations. It was error for 
the Court to improperly convert Respondent's Motion to Dismiss into a summary 
judgment motion without giving proper notice. Because the Petition survives a rule 
12(b)(6) review, the matter must be remanded for further proceedings below, giving 
Petitioner an opportunity to prove her allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The trial court's failure to provide adequate notice to the parties regarding the 
conversion from the rule 12(b)(6) motion to on for summary judgment constitutes plain 
error. Establishment of a plain error requires a showing of: (1) an error; (2) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Holgate, 
10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 2000). The trial court did not follow the procedure outlined by 
Rule 12 regarding conversion of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary 
judgment. Because the conversion process is set forth in the language of Rule 12, the 
error should have been obvious to the court. As demonstrated above, had the trial court 
proceeded as a Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner would have prevailed. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS OUTSTANDING 
As set out in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment ". . . shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Summary judgment is the process of establishing a right to judgment by law, whereby the 
court evaluates all evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and, 
finding no genuine issues of material fact applicable to the rule of law exist, grants the 
requested relief. Utah courts have explained this purpose is effectuated by allowing the 
parties to pierce the pleadings and determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact. 
Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). The mere existence of issues of fact 
does not preclude summary judgment; issues must be material to the applicable rule of 
law. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). In determining whether 
genuine issues of material fact exist, the court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 
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(Utah 1980). This does not require the court to turn a blind eye to reasonable inferences 
based upon uncontested facts. Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 10 P.3d 338, 
345 (Utah 2000). Finally, the moving party must establish its right to judgment on 
applicable law as applied to the undisputed material issues of fact. Lamb v. B & B 
Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993). 
If there are facts that are in dispute then it is not appropriate for the court to weigh 
the evidence presented by the parties and proceed with a ruling without a trial. Kilpatrick 
v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah App.,1996). 
"[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the 
credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of 
evidence. Neither is it to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed 
issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate the time, trouble[,] and expense of 
trial when upon any view taken of the facts as asserted by the party ruled 
against, he would not be entitled to prevail." 
IdL at 1101 (quoting Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Moreover, 
"
 c
 it only takes one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other 
side of the controversy and create an issue of fact.' " Id. (quoting Holbrook, 542 P.2d at 
193) (emphasis added). 
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The facts material to Petitioner's claims are: (1) whether Petitioner's counsel, at 
both the trial and appellate levels, were deficient in their respective performance and (2) 
whether that deficiency resulted in prejudice to Petitioner. Stated in another way, the 
court should analyze whether the outcome of the scenario would have been different had 
counsel not acted in a deficient manner. Respondent presented evidence that Petitioner's 
plea was knowing and voluntary in the form of the transcript from Petitioner's sentencing 
hearing and Petitioner's Statement in Advance of Plea (which contained much of the 
same information as the sentencing hearing transcript.) Respondent relied exclusively on 
these two documents in refuting Petitioner's claims, indicating that Petitioner's guilty 
plea creates the presumption that the proceedings were regular and that Respondent's 
pleas were "knowing and voluntary." 
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed affidavits with her Petition, arguing that her 
plea was not knowing and voluntary. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that her trial 
counsel "coerced" her into changing her plea of guilty. Petitioner also alleged several 
instances showing that her plea was not knowing and voluntary, because facts relevant to 
the plea were not disclosed to her by her attorney. Further, the Petition sets forth other 
instances where the plea colloquy was contradictory. 
In its ruling, the trial court relied upon the transcripts of the plea hearing in 
supporting the adequacy of the representation. The court cited to the picture provided by 
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Petitioner, stating "the picture shows concern and comfort by her trial counsel as 
Attorney Mary Corpoon's fingers are lightly around Petitioner's shoulder instead of 
being 'firmly pressed' on her shoulder." (R 234.) The court concluded that Petitioner 
did not provide any evidence showing that counsel's performance was unreasonable. 
These findings by the court constitute a weighing of the evidence by the court, 
improper on summary judgment. Petitioner raised facts via affidavit that she was 
coerced. She laid out the facts that justified her feelings of coercion: her depression and 
use of medication; promises made by counsel that a certain sentence was likely; that 
counsel threatened her by talking about how awful death row was (in spite of the fact that 
no woman had been sentenced to death in Utah); that counsel told Petitioner that she 
would have to lie to the judge during the plea colloquy; that counsel incorrectly advised 
her about an Alford plea; that counsel incorrectly informed her of her rights on appeal; 
that counsel did not advise her appropriately regarding her waiver of jury trial at the 
sentencing phase of her case. (R. 18-20.) Petitioner also relied upon these same facts 
with regards to her claims that waiver of rights in her plea was unknowing and therefore 
involuntary. By way of her affidavit, Petitioner placed these facts in controversy. Rather 
than resolve those facts at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the court 
should have denied the summary judgment motion and permitted the matter to proceed to 
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hearing. By reviewing the evidence and making findings regarding it, the court engaged 
in improper weighing and balancing of the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court remand 
the matter to the trial court with instructions that the trial court set this matter for 
evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's Petition. 
Dated this j v day of August, 2011. 
FROERER AHLSTROM, PLLC 
Ifles R. Ahls^rom 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMRA RHINEHART, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 080102055 
| Judge: Kevin K. Allen 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief. In preparation for its decision, 
the Court has reviewed the Motion and Memorandum, the Opposition, the Reply, each document 
submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions. In addition, oral 
arguments were received on March 31, 2010. Having considered the forgoing, the Court issues 
this Memorandum Decision. 
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel: 
Petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "First, the defendant 
must show that counsel's performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. "Additionally, "proof of ineffective 
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."" 
Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12,f36 (Utah 2009) (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 
(Utah 1993)). 
As to the first prong, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that her counsel's representation 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, at 688. Although Petitioner 
argues that she was coerced into making the plea by her trial counsel and that her trial counsel 
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mislead her about the sentence she should receive, the record does not support such contentions. 
Rather, the record demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly affirmed that she had adequate 
opportunity to talk with her attorneys, that she was fully satisfied with her counsel's 
representation and advice received, and that she was not coerced or made promises in entering 
her plea. Petitioner also fully waived her right to have Attorney Scott Williams present. In 
addition, Mr. William's Affidavit acknowledges that the plea "was an appropriate resolution." 
Moreover, the newspaper picture that Petitioner has submitted does not support her allegation of 
coercion. Rather, the picture suggests concern and comfort by her trial counsel as Attorney Mary 
Corporon's fingers are lightly around Petitioner's shoulder instead of being "firmly" pressed on 
her shoulder. Therefore, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that would 
objectively demonstrate that her counsel's representation was unreasonable. See generally State 
v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Coupled with Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the claim that her 
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because she was mentally or emotionally 
unstable. However, this claim is also refuted by the plea colloquy. The court accepted 
Petitioner's plea only after specifically addressing Petitioner's use of Lexapro and her ability to 
understand the proceedings and consequences of entering her plea. Also, Petitioner represented to 
the Court that she did not have any mental or emotional problems or disabilities which would 
interfere with her ability to understand the proceedings. As such, Petitioner has failed to show 
that her plea was unknowing and involuntary or that her counsel was ineffective by failing to stop 
her from entering a knowing and voluntary plea. 
Additionally, the meticulous and thorough plea colloquy done by the court accepting 
Petitioner's plea, overcame any alleged deficiencies in Petitioner's trial counsel's representations 
regarding the rights given up and consequences of entering her plea. Based on the foregoing, the 
Court finds that the allegations in the Petition are insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Petitioner's trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. It is reasonable for trial counsel to advise a client to accept a plea offer sparing 
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them a possible death sentence. Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^[37. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to 
satisfy the Strickland test. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel: 
Petitioner argues that her appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the issue of 
a misplea on appeal. Petitioner argues that her plea was flawed because "[s]he was under the 
influence of Lexapro, extremely emotional, and collapsed during the proceeding" and because 
she was not correctly informed of her rights. (Petition, 12). However, the record of the plea-
hearing evidences that her plea was not flawed. The court was aware that Petitioner was taking 
Lexapro. The court on more than one occasion addressed the effects Lexapro had on Petitioner's 
ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. In all cases, Petitioner stated that the medication 
did not negatively affect her. More important, Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that 
the Lexapro impaired her ability to enter her guilty plea. Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, f 11 (Utah 
2006) (holding that "[t]he critical question is whether the drugs - if they have a capacity to 
impair the defendant's ability to plea - have in fact done so on this occasion"). 
In most instances, . . . when a mood-altering drug is given to a defendant by a 
physician, it is to improve the defendant's cognitive abilities. In other words, the fact 
that a defendant has undergone a medical evaluation and is receiving medication to 
treat a psychological infirmity is often evidence weighing in favor of a finding that 
the defendant is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea. 
Id. at f 14. It has also been established that a trial court need not, sua sponte, move for a 
competency hearing when a defendant is ""coherent," "respond[s] to questions appropriately," 
and "repeatedly affirmfs]" [her] choice to plead guilty." Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^29 (quoting State 
v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, TJ53 (Utah 2003)). Also, Petitioner has failed to assert that the Rule 11 
plea colloquy was improper as was the case in State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App. 496, [^22 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2005). (holding that the jurisdictional time limit imposed on a motion to withdraw did not 
effect a court's ability to set aside a plea when the court finds that the plea was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made). Rather, the plea hearing record establishes that the court determined, more 
than once, that the Petitioner in tact was mentally capable of entering a plea and that such plea 
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was in feet knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made. 
As such, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for Petitioner's appellate counsel to 
"fail" to assert a "misplea" claim on direct appeal. Petitioner has failed to show that there was "a 
reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief, 
[s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal." Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, [^25 (Utah 2008) (quoting 
Smith v. Rabbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286, 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000)). Therefore, Petitioner has failed to 
meet her burden under the Strickland test as to this claim. 
Conclusion: 
Petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proof on both of her grounds for relief raised 
in her Petition. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. Counsel for Respondent is directed 
to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this ^9~day of May, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
'¥fav£&$ '*•»«<»•» »*•»• G^ "*, c:'ih ISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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